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Abstract
The Dodd-Frank Act amended the Commodity Exchange Act and adopted an explicit prohi-
bition regarding activity commonly known as spoofing in commodities markets. This Note argues
that the spoofing prohibition is a necessary step towards improved market discipline and price in-
tegrity in the relevant commodities markets. It fills an important gap in the CEA in relation to an
elusive form of price manipulation activity by providing an explicit statutory authority on which
regulators and market operators may rely in policing suspect trading strategies falling under the
spoofing umbrella.
Congress’ explicit denouncement of spoofing as an illegal act has ramifications not only for traders,
but also for brokers and market makers. In the past, when courts have considered the issue of sec-
ondary liability of brokers regarding manipulative activity of their customers in the context of
wash sales, they have determined the CEA’s explicit prohibition of wash sales and the relatively
easier identification of wash sales activity as important factors that may potentially increase the
secondary liability risk of derivatives brokers. Applying the same analogy to spoofing, greater
public awareness and the increasing visibility of spoofing activity (resulting from improvements
in the monitoring systems of regulators and market operators) will provide strong incentives for
market participants to adapt to changing norms.
However, areas of concern, such as risk of selective enforcement and inconsistencies among the
applicable market rules, will pose challenges in the spoofing prohibition’s implementation. There-
fore, regulators must seek cooperation with relevant market operators to encourage structural re-
form and self-regulatory measures, such as implementation of appropriate structural safeguards
into the trading infrastructure.
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DODD-FRANK AND THE SPOOFING 
PROHIBITION IN COMMODITIES MARKETS 
Meric Sar* 
The Dodd-Frank Act amended the Commodity Exchange Act and 
adopted an explicit prohibition regarding activity commonly known 
as spoofing in commodities markets. This Note argues that the 
spoofing prohibition is a necessary step towards improved market 
discipline and price integrity in the relevant commodities markets. It 
fills an important gap in the CEA in relation to an elusive form of price 
manipulation activity by providing an explicit statutory authority on 
which regulators and market operators may rely in policing suspect 
trading strategies falling under the spoofing umbrella. Congress’ 
explicit denouncement of spoofing as an illegal act has ramifications 
not only for traders, but also for brokers and market makers. In the 
past, when courts have considered the issue of secondary liability of 
brokers regarding manipulative activity of their customers in the 
context of wash sales, they have determined the CEA’s explicit 
prohibition of wash sales and the relatively easier identification of 
wash sales activity as important factors that may potentially increase 
the secondary liability risk of derivatives brokers. Applying the same 
analogy to spoofing, greater public awareness and the increasing 
visibility of spoofing activity (resulting from improvements in the 
monitoring systems of regulators and market operators) will provide 
strong incentives for market participants to adapt to changing norms. 
However, areas of concern, such as risk of selective enforcement and 
inconsistencies among the applicable market rules, will pose 
challenges in the spoofing prohibition’s implementation. Therefore, 
regulators must seek cooperation with relevant market operators to 
encourage structural reform and self-regulatory measures, such as 
implementation of appropriate structural safeguards into the trading 
infrastructure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For a long time the illegality of spoofing has been a point of 
contention among lawyers and economists. Spoofing is a form of price 
manipulation activity.1 A spoofer submits to a market non-bona fide price 
quotes in order to cause artificial price volatility.2 It creates market noise, 
and makes an order book unreliable and deceptive for analysts and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Eun Jung Leea, Kyong Shik Eomb & Kyung Suh Park, Microstructure-
Based Manipulation: Strategic Behavior and Performance of Spoofing Traders, 16 J. FIN. 
MKTS. 227 (2013). 
 2. Id. 
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traders.3 Usually, it is employed as part of a predatory trading strategy in 
which the trader actually holds an opposite market position—or has the 
intent to immediately take such a position—to take unfair advantage of 
the market’s confusion caused by the deceptive market signals created by 
the trader. Among myriad other important changes, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) introduced 
a statutory prohibition on spoofing for the first time, with a limited 
application to commodities markets in its current form.4 
The spoofing provision is remarkable for two reasons. First, its 
enactment coincides with a growing discontent in the financial industry 
regarding predatory trading conduct in general.5 Second, though widely 
accepted as detrimental to the price discovery function of the markets,6 
spoofing activity was in the past too elusive to prosecute under the general 
anti-manipulation authority of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”).7 
Thus, the prohibition has the potential to drastically alter the way markets 
operate by creating a stand-alone statutory prohibition that can be 
enforced by both agency actions and private lawsuits.8 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See generally Steven R. McNamara, The Law and Ethics of High-Frequency 
Trading, 17 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 71 (2016); Alvaro Cartea et al., Ultra-Fast 
Activity and Market Quality (Apr. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2616627 [https://perma.cc/F24W-EBDU]. 
 4. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2012); see also CFTC, Staff Roundtable on Disruptive 
Trading Practices (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/idcucm/groups/public/@swaps/do 
cuments/dfsubmission/dfsubmission24_120210-transcri.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G9C-9H 
UU]. 
 5. See generally Matthew Leising & Janan Hanna, Can a $24 Billion Hedge Fund 
Blow the Whistle? Citadel Thinks So, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.bloomb 
erg.com/news/articles/2016-04-29/can-a-24-billion-hedge-fund-blow-the-whistle-citade 
l-thinks-so [https://perma.cc/6C2X-MHMB]. 
 6. See In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 184 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“This makes sense: excessive speculation, just as much as manipulation, can result 
in market illiquidity and artificial prices.”). 
 7. For the difficulty of proving spoofing cases under the pre-Dodd-Frank anti-
manipulation standard, see Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC, Statement Regarding Anti-
Fraud and Anti-Manipulation Final Rules: The Waiting (July 7, 2011), http://www.cftc. 
gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement070711 [https://perma.cc/5EFX-L 
3VT]. 
 8. See 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012). CEA’s explicit grant of authority for private right of 
action is a distinct feature of commodities law in comparison to the judicially developed 
availability of private right of action in securities law, the doctrine of which was, to a big 
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CEA broadly defines spoofing as “bidding or offering with the intent 
to cancel the bid or offer before execution” in relation to any trading that 
occurs on, or subject to, the rules of an exchange regulated by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).9 Although the 
prohibition applies to both manual and automated trading, in today’s 
markets where the majority of day trading is conducted via algorithmic 
trading strategies, the ramifications of the prohibition can be manifold for 
institutional proprietary traders, brokers, and market makers.10 
The increasing availability of hyper-frequency trading infrastructure 
to access the interrelated markets for thousands of different securities and 
derivatives contracts renders the policing of predatory trading practices a 
priority for market regulators and participants.11 In the age of advanced 
trading technology that is widely available, events such as the flash crash 
of 2010, during which the stock market fluctuated more than 9% within 
thirty-six minutes while “bids on dozens of ETFs (and other stocks) fell 
as low as a penny a share,”12 demonstrate the inherent fragility of daily 
                                                                                                                 
extent, developed by the courts. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723 (1975). 
 9. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012). 
 10. See RICHARD HAYNES & JOHN S. ROBERTS, CFTC, AUTOMATED TRADING IN 
FUTURES MARKETS (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economic 
analysis/documents/file/oce_automatedtrading.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFC3-YVE9] 
(“Recent studies on automated trading in domestic markets have found that often over 
half of the trades on securities and futures exchanges make some use of algorithms . . . to 
match trades, oversee certain order types (e.g., stop orders) and monitor general market 
risk.”); see also CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 3693429, at *15 (N.D. 
Ill. July 12, 2016) (“Algorithmic traders include a variety of participants, ranging from 
brokerage firms who seek favorable trade executions on behalf of clients entering long-
term investment positions or hedges to proprietary firms who trade on a principal basis 
in pursuit of short-term profit opportunities.”). 
 11. Spoofing-type activity is argued to be one of the contributing factors to the flash 
crash of May 6, 2010. See Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: High Frequency 
Trading in an Electronic Market, 72 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2017). The systemic risk caused 
by algorithmic trading strategies has been studied since the 1980s. See Lewis D. Solomon 
Howard, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 
191 (1988). 
 12. Ari I. Weinberg, Should You Fear the ETF?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-you-fear-the-etf-1449457201 [https://perma.cc/CU 
5L-AXA6]. 
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markets against disruptive market practices.13 Under the prohibition, a 
wide range of trading activity traditionally perceived as legitimate may 
constitute unlawful conduct as the traders’ algorithms and their design 
features will come under greater scrutiny.14 
On the other hand, there is great confusion in the trading industry 
regarding the spoofing prohibition, generally due to the difficulty of 
distinguishing spoofing from other similar but lawful conduct from a 
theoretical and practical standpoint.15 Despite the rule’s simplistic 
language, some critics are concerned with selective and discriminatory 
enforcement that may emanate from the difficulties in detecting minor 
incidents of spoofing in today’s vast global markets. Indeed, practical 
issues such as limited access to order book data, technical difficulties in 
developing proper detection systems, inconsistencies in the applicable 
market rules, and the asymmetrical enforcement standards of the 
responsible government and self-regulatory organizations have the 
potential to undermine the fundamental premise of the spoofing 
prohibition.16 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See generally Michael Lewis, Crash Boys, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2014), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-04-24/michael-lewis-has-questions-abo 
ut-flash-crash [https://perma.cc/7374-N64K] (“On the day of the flash crash, Sarao never 
actually sold stocks. He was trying to trick the market into falling so that he could buy in 
more cheaply. But whom did he fool with his trick? Whose algorithms were so easily 
gamed that they responded to phony sell orders by creating a crash? Stupidity isn’t a 
crime. Still, it would be interesting to know who, at this particular poker table, on this 
particular day, was the fool.”). 
 14. Regulation Automated Trading, 81 Fed. Reg. 85,334 (Nov. 25, 2016). 
 15. For a more in depth discussion of the vagueness issue, see Catriona Coppler, The 
Anti-Spoofing Statute: Vague as Applied to the “Hypothetically Legitimate Trader”, 5 
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 261 (2016). 
 16. Coherence in market rules and enforcement policies undercut arbitrage-seeking 
behavior and provide efficiencies in relation to compliance for all market participants. 
For a theoretical analogy see NASSIM N. TALEB, SKIN IN THE GAME 30-31 (May 28, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/minority.pdf [https://pe 
rma.cc/B6D5-SAQL]. (“The Kosher population represents less than three tenth[s] of 
[U.S. residents]. Yet, it appears that almost all drinks are Kosher. Why? Simply because 
going full Kosher allows the producer, grocer, restaurant, to not have to distinguish 
between Kosher and non-kosher for liquids, with special markers, separate aisles, 
separate inventories, different stocking sub-facilities. . . . If the people following the 
minority rule lived [in separation from the rest of the society], with their separate small 
economy, then the minority rule would not apply. But, when a population has an even 
spatial distribution, say the ratio of such a minority in a neighborhood is the same as that 
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This Note, however, argues that the prohibition is a necessary step 
towards improved market discipline and compliance standards, and fills 
an important gap in the CEA by providing explicit statutory authority to 
allow regulators to curb an activity that directly undermines the “efficient 
market hypothesis” and poses systemic risks to markets.17 In the context 
of wash sales, the courts have interpreted factors such as the specific 
prohibition of wash sales by the CEA and the relatively easy identification 
of wash sale activity as a legal basis that may potentially increase the 
secondary liability risk of derivatives brokers.18 Applying the same 
analogy to the spoofing context, it would be a fair assessment to say that 
the explicit statutory prohibition, greater public awareness regarding 
spoofing, and the increasing visibility of spoofing activity resulting from 
improvements in the monitoring systems of regulators and market 
operators will provide strong incentives for market participants to adapt 
to changing norms.19 In this context, it is likely that the CFTC’s and the 
SEC’s whistleblower programs will also incentivize independent market 
observers and analysts to detect and report suspicious market conduct and 
allow them to play a greater role in regulatory enforcement. 
This Note first analyzes the normative elements of the new 
prohibition in comparison with the CEA’s pre-Dodd-Frank anti-
manipulation authority. The Note then addresses the recent and ongoing 
                                                                                                                 
in the village, that in the village is the same as in the county, that in the county is the same 
as that in state, and that in the state is the same as nationwide, then the (flexible) majority 
will have to submit to the minority rule. Second, the cost structure matters quite a bit. It 
happens in our first example that making lemonade compliant with Kosher laws doesn’t 
change the price by much, not enough to justify inventories. But if the manufacturing of 
Kosher lemonade cost substantially more, then the rule will be weakened in some 
nonlinear proportion to the difference in costs. If it cost ten times as much to make Kosher 
food, then the minority rule will not apply, except perhaps in some very rich 
neighborhoods.”). 
 17. Bart Chilton, supra note 7; see also Sam Mamudi & Ryan Hoerger, Bats Wants 
Permission to Crack Down on Spoofing Faster, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2015), https://ww 
w.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-30/bats-wants-permission-to-crack-down-on-
spoofing-faster-in-u-s- [https://perma.cc/2PUX-SL3S]. 
 18. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 187 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(“Wash orders are explicitly banned by the CEA and, because they involve simultaneous 
or shortly spaced transactions to buy and sell the same quantity of a commodity or stock, 
they are much more recognizable to the broker transmitting them.”). 
 19. Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031, 
1075 (2016). 
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spoofing cases brought under the new statute, as well as other spoofing 
cases brought by the CFTC, the SEC, market operators, and private 
individuals under the pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation provisions. The 
Note also compares the spoofing statute with similar norms in the 
securities area and delineates the divergence that is currently developing 
between the fields of commodities and securities laws in relation to the 
statutory requirements for a prima facie case of spoofing. Finally, the 
Note argues that, despite the criticism, the spoofing prohibition serves an 
important purpose and will play an integral role in improving market 
discipline not only through public enforcement, but also through private 
lawsuits, improved market monitoring, and self-regulatory actions. 
I. FROM PRICE-MANIPULATION UNDER CEA TO A STAND-ALONE 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
 
Pre-Dodd-Frank actions against spoofing were generally brought as 
claims of price manipulation20 or false reporting21 under the CEA.22 The 
explicit illegality of spoofing under the CEA is new, but activities which 
generally fall under spoofing have been prosecuted before by the SEC and 
self-regulatory organizations under various general anti-manipulation 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (making it illegal to “offer to enter into, 
enter into, or confirm the execution of a transaction” that “is used to cause any price to 
be reported, registered, or recorded that is not a true and bona fide price”). Generally, the 
CFTC required the following elements to be met: (i) offering to enter into the execution 
of transactions; (ii) involving the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery that; 
(3) caused a price to be reported, registered, or recorded that was not true and bona fide. 
Id. 
 21. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (prohibiting actions “caus[ing] [the 
delivery/transmission of] false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning 
crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any 
commodity in interstate commerce”). 
 22. See In re Bunge Glob. Mkts., Inc., CFTC No. 11-10 (Mar. 22, 2011) 
(demonstrating a Pre-Dodd-Frank enforcement action where two traders entered and later 
on cancelled orders for Chicago Board of Trade soybean futures at certain price levels 
before the market opened causing an artificial alteration at the Indicative Opening Price); 
Press Release, CFTC, Federal Court Orders Eric Moncada to Pay $1.56 Million Penalty 
for Attempting to Manipulate the Wheat Futures Market (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7026-14 [https://perma.cc/AQ8S-2EV 
M] (demonstrating a settlement for manipulation attempt). 
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provisions found within the respective securities statutes and other 
applicable market regulations. 
A. CO-EXISTING NORMS 
Spoofing actions share large commonalities with anti-manipulation 
claims, but Dodd-Frank created a separate commodities spoofing cause 
of action that has some overlaps with as well as differences from the 
existing anti-manipulation norms.23 In fact, in its recent practice, the 
CFTC has treated the concepts separately by formulating claims for both 
price manipulation and spoofing independently in relation to the same 
conduct.24 This represents a picture where the spoofing prohibition tends 
to be treated by the regulators as a special form of manipulation, which 
requires the showing of a certain statutorily defined trading pattern 
sufficient to establish unlawful conduct. 
Generally under the pre-Dodd-Frank manipulation standard, conduct 
such as spoofing only amounted to price manipulation where (i) the 
defendant had the ability to influence market prices; (ii) an artificial price 
actually existed; (iii) the defendants caused the artificial prices; and (iv) 
the defendants specifically intended to cause the artificial prices.25 In most 
cases, the presence of actual causality and the existence of artificial prices 
usually hinged on the same factual inquiry that would also determine 
whether the more difficult to prove elements of the pre-Dodd-Frank 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Generally, the question of whether a case will be tried based on the pre-Dodd-
Frank price manipulation standard or the new spoofing prohibition depends on which rule 
was in effect at the time of the trading activity. 
 24. See Consent Order, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-3398 (E.D. 
Ill. Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/docu 
ments/legalpleading/enfsaraoorder111416.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN6L-9BX3]; Consent 
Order, CFTC v. Heet Khara, No. 15 CV 03497 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016), http://w 
ww.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfhee
tsalimorder033116.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PWG-73T2]. 
 25. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013); 
In re Shak, CFTC No. 14-03, 2013 WL 7085760 (Nov. 25, 2011); In re Pia, CFTC No. 
11-17 (July 25, 2011); In re DiPlacido, CFTC No. 01-23, 2008 WL 4831204 (Nov. 5, 
2008), aff’d in pertinent part, Di Placido v. CFTC, 364 Fed App’x 657 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Complaint, CFTC v. Wilson, No. 13-CV-7884, 2013 WL 5940001 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 
2013); Complaint, CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., No. 07-CV-6682, 2007 WL 
2211181 (S.D.N.Y July 25, 2007). 
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standard—“ability to influence market prices”26 and “specific intent to 
influence market prices”—were met.27 The “specific intent” element 
under the pre-Dodd-Frank standard purported to be the one that required 
the most clarity, especially concerning whether the showing of specific 
intent required something more than a general intent to affect market 
prices. 
B. WILSON CASE: SPOOFING DOES NOT NECESSARILY “SOUND IN 
FRAUD”—ABILITY TO CAUSE AND THE EXISTENCE OF ARTIFICIAL PRICE 
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Wilson—a highly 
publicized spoofing case adjudicated under the pre-Dodd-Frank 
authority—a district court in the Southern District of New York rejected 
the defendant proprietary trading firm’s motion to dismiss, finding that 
the CFTC had alleged facts sufficient to establish a price manipulation 
claim under CEA Section 9(a)(2).28 The case involved the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 F.App’x at 661 (“Even supposing that all large 
traders in illiquid markets possess the ability to influence those markets, the 
Commission’s inclusion of ‘the ability to influence the market price,’ rather than market 
control, as an element of manipulation is hardly arbitrary or capricious, as three other 
elements, including specific intent, must also be satisfied to establish liability. . . . The 
Commission acted reasonably in concluding that DiPlacido had the ability to influence 
prices where, on the relevant dates, his trades over two minutes at the Close accounted 
for an average 14% of a full day’s volume.”). 
 27. CFTC v. Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d 517, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting In re Energy 
Transfer Partners Nat. Gas Litig., 07 Civ. 3349, 2009 WL 2633781, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 
26, 2009)) (“To meet the specific intent element of a claim for manipulation or attempted 
manipulation of a futures contract, the Commission must plead that Defendants ‘acted 
(or failed to act) with the purpose or conscious object of causing or effecting a price or 
price trend in the market that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and 
demand.’”). 
 28. Id. at 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The case related to the defendant’s activities that 
took advantage of the so-called convexity bias/effect that occurs in the relevant market 
during the market’s daily settlement. Id. at 523-25 (“The CFTC alleges 
that DRW acquired its long position in order to take advantage of the convexity bias in 
the Three–Month Contract and the fact that IDCH did not apply a PAI adjustment that 
would counteract that bias . . . . In the months preceding its investment, DRW conducted 
research into the methodology used by IDCH in generating the IDEX Curve and setting 
the net present value of party’s open positions. In a July 23, 2010 email Wilson instructed 
several of his subordinates to ‘[c]onfirm the contract has full convexity bias (despite the 
fact they will force it to settle at non-convexity based prices)’ . . . . On August 30, 2010, 
after DRW had begun to acquire its open position, a DRW trader stated that the Three–
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alleged spoofing in relation to an exchange-traded interest rate futures 
contract called the IDEX USD Three-Month Interest Rate Swap Futures 
Contract. In Wilson, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a 
spoofing claim based on the CEA’s anti-manipulation authority should be 
subject to heightened pleading standards as applied to allegations that 
“sound in fraud.”29 According to the court, “although manipulation and 
attempted manipulation claims that ‘sound in fraud’ are evaluated under 
the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) . . . fraud [is] not a 
necessary element of a market manipulation claim.”30 In its decision, the 
court accepted the CFTC’s theory of attempted manipulation as non-
fraudulent misconduct that is “not based on misleading statements or 
omissions, but rather on a particular trading strategy,” one that involved 
“the timing of trades intended to change the closing price.”31 Indeed, for 
the purposes of pleading standards, a similar conceptual separation 
between allegations of explicit and implicit price manipulation is well 
accepted in the securities law context.32 This approach is justified under 
                                                                                                                 
Month Contract is ‘flawed and we are working on taking advantage of the PAI/Convexity 
flaw.’ According to the complaint, the same trader stated during 
the CFTC’s investigation that, consistent with DRW’s goals, his role was to ‘buy as 
much of this stuff as I could at prices that I thought were cheap because, yes, where I 
thought they were valued . . . much higher.’” (citations omitted)). 
 29. Id. at 532 (citing CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 244 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)) (“[T]he weight of authority rejects this bright line rule in favor of a 
case-by-case examination into whether the allegations do, in fact, ‘sound in fraud.’”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 566, 579–80 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), supplemented on reconsideration, 399 F. Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Market 
manipulation cases are treated differently in large part because the method of generating 
demand in the marketplace is secretive and difficult for an investor to detect. When wash 
sales are used to increase trading volume and simulate greater demand for a security, 
investors may be misled into believing that the rest of the market has discovered some 
positive information, and is purchasing shares to take advantage of that implicit ‘good 
news.’ . . . A necessary corollary of the efficient market hypothesis is that when an 
investor observes heightened market activity and a rise in share prices, that investor relies 
on market efficiency to support the assumption that new information has entered the 
market. Thus, while misrepresentations affect investor beliefs firsthand—by directly 
injecting false information into the marketplace—market manipulation affects beliefs 
indirectly by creating circumstantial evidence that positive information has entered the 
market. When secret manipulation affects beliefs indirectly, courts understand that it may 
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the efficient market hypothesis, which holds that “public information is 
immediately incorporated into . . . price.”33 Spoofing, as a special form of 
implicit price manipulation, involves market manipulation by way of 
directly distorting the market price via sending non-bona fide orders to an 
exchange (as opposed to misrepresentations involving public statements 
and events). Accordingly, courts usually lower the pleading standard due 
to the subtle form of the alleged manipulation and the potentially onerous 
evidentiary challenges in meeting the burden of heightened pleading 
standards.34 
Here, the court held that the CFTC’s allegations passed the necessary 
pleading standards in establishing both the ability to influence market 
prices35 and the specific intent to do so, based on an investigation that 
showed that the firm’s management deliberately studied and executed the 
relevant market arbitrage opportunity.36 When defining the “existence of 
artificial prices,” the court borrowed a test from antitrust doctrine that 
defines the element broadly as any price that “does not reflect basic forces 
                                                                                                                 
be more difficult for plaintiffs to outline the scheme with great particularity; thus, market 
manipulation plaintiffs are given more leeway in alleging manipulative conduct.”). 
 33. Id. at 579 (citing In re Exec. Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1028 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)) (“Under the efficient market hypothesis endorsed by the plurality in 
Basic v. Levinson, the price of a security reflects all publicly available information.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 533. “[T]he CFTC has alleged that the head of 
quantitative research at DRW acknowledged that DRW could influence prices, stating 
that as a result of Defendants’ practices, the ‘IDCG settle curve is DRW defined.’” Id. at 
532. 
 36. Id. (“The CFTC alleges that DRW’s head of quantitative research stated to 
Wilson that as a result of DRW’s ‘“new regime,” the ‘“IDCG settle curve 
is DRW defined.”’ Id. ¶ 53. The CFTC has also alleged that another market participant 
complained to DRW in February 2011 that DRW ‘“get[s] to set the mark,”’ and 
that DRW continued its allegedly manipulative bidding activity through August  
2011. . . . Defendants also maintain that their bids were ‘based on their own calculations 
and beliefs about value’ and, therefore, that the requisite intent was lacking. Def. Mem. 
15–16. Although Defendants may attempt to prove at a later stage of the litigation that 
their bids reflected a ‘legitimate source of demand,’ see id., this issue is not appropriate 
for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage. With respect to both the manipulation and 
attempted manipulation claims, the CFTC has alleged facts capable of showing that 
Defendants specifically intended to influence the market price of the Three–Month 
Contract.”). 
394 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
of supply and demand.”37 Thus, the tests for showing the necessary ability 
to cause artificial prices and the existence of artificial prices have 
metastasized into a single inquiry for purposes of a motion to dismiss.38 
This was contrary to a Southern District of Texas court decision that 
found the pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation standard—and its condition 
regarding the existence of an artificial price—unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to certain defendants.39 Some of the evidence factored in by the 
Wilson court included the duration of the relevant trading activity (the 
defendant adopted spoofing for more than 118 days without entering into 
an actual trade) and other facts and circumstances surrounding the 
defendant’s trading behavior.40 The court took into account the excessive 
price differences resulting from the defendant’s bids, and the rapid order 
withdrawals by the defendant during the settlement period when the 
market became particularly exposed to this trading strategy due to the 
convexity bias.41 The court found the defendant’s arguments defending its 
conduct as lawful arbitrage activity that actually served to correct the 
market price unpersuasive.42 The evidence was sufficient to meet the 
“causality” standard for deciding on the motion to dismiss.43 Thus, the 
case is a reminder of the wide traction the spoofing prohibition had 
achieved even in the pre-Dodd-Frank regime. This is particularly striking 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at 533 (quoting CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 245 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)) (“[M]arket manipulation in its various manifestations is implicitly an 
artificial stimulus applied to (or at times a brake on) market prices, a force which distorts 
those prices, a factor which prevents the determination of those prices by free competition 
alone.”). 
 38. Parnon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 245 (citing Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola, 
315 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)) (“By analogy to antitrust law, where an element of 
proof involves the ability to affect prices, a complaint is sufficient if it alleges ‘direct 
measurements of a defendant’s ability to control prices . . . .’”). 
 39. United States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803, 813–14 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 
632 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The government fails in this regard because the definition 
of ‘artificial’ is uncertain, and that uncertainty makes application of the manipulation 
statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. . . . Today’s markets 
are filled with speculators attempting to make profits based on movement in prices of 
commodities and other products with no intention of ever consuming or producing them. 
That is what the defendants were doing in this case, and there is no law or case which 
prohibits speculation.”). 
 40. Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 533–34. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 535. 
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as the pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation authority subjected spoofing 
claims to particularly difficult prima facie case standards of archetypical 
price manipulation cases. 
II. POST-DODD-FRANK STANDARD: INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR SPOOFING 
Section 747 of Dodd-Frank adopted three separate commodities 
offenses in relation to all commodities trading activity occurring in 
regulated markets. These offenses include (i) “violating bids or offers;” 
(ii) “intentional or reckless disregard for the orderly execution of 
transactions during the closing period;” and (iii) all conduct that “is of the 
character of, or is commonly known to the trade ‘spoofing’ (bidding or 
offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution).”44 
Section 747 also further amended Section 4c(a) of the CEA to grant broad 
authority to the CFTC to promulgate such “rules and regulations as, in the 
judgment of the Commission, are reasonably necessary to prohibit the 
trading practices” enumerated in Section 747 together with “any other 
trading practice that is disruptive of fair and equitable trading.”45  
The new prohibition will lower the prima facie case threshold in 
price manipulation claims involving spoofing since it does not require the 
showing of “specific intent” and the existence of or the ability to cause 
artificial prices. Prior to Dodd-Frank, spoofing cases brought under the 
general price manipulation statute had to show specific intent to 
                                                                                                                 
 44. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2012). Although this paper focuses on spoofing, CEA 
Section 4(c)(a)(5) also makes it illegal to “violate bids and offers” under a strict liability 
standard (to buy or sell any contract for prices except the lower/highest available offer/bid 
prices), see id. § 6c(a)(5)(A), and other activities that demonstrate intentional or reckless 
trading patterns during the closing period of markets (an activity commonly referred to 
as “banging the close”). See id. § 6c(a)(5)(B). According to the CFTC, the rule against 
“violating bids and offers” does not introduce a “best execution standard across multiple 
markets,” and the trader’s obligation regarding the rule is limited to the confines of the 
specific trading venue utilized at a given moment of time. See Antidisruptive Practices 
Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,943, 14,946 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011). The CFTC also stated 
this prohibition shall apply primarily in trading environments where a person exercises 
at least some control over the selection of bids and offers, and shall generally not apply 
when the trading occurs on an electronic trading system where bid matching occurs 
automatically. See id. 
 45. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(6) (2012). 
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manipulate the market price.46 For conduct that occurred following the 
enactment of Dodd-Frank, the claimants will need to show specific 
intention only with regards to the spoofing activity, viz., sending orders 
without having a bona fide intent to enter into actual transactions. The 
statutory prohibition will function as a gap-filler by establishing three 
important legal assumptions: (i) that spoofing is a per se form of price 
manipulation, (ii) that price manipulation is a primary motive for the 
perpetrator of spoofing, and (iii) that it is generally irrelevant whether the 
perpetrator had the actual ability to manipulate the market price. In cases 
where the defendant’s bid-offer practices establish a consistent pattern 
indicating a conscious effort to avoid entering into any transactions, the 
requisite intent element can be easily met, unlike the onerous prima facie 
case standard of the classical price manipulation cases.47 On the other 
hand, as is discussed below, the enactment of the spoofing statute seems 
to have created a divergence between the anti-manipulation standards in 
commodities and securities laws, since as of yet, there is no explicit 
statutory prohibition in securities laws against spoofing. 
Since its enactment, the new spoofing statute was thus far upheld 
against constitutional challenges for vagueness. Courts rejected this 
challenge, since, when taken together with the relevant guidance issued 
by the CFTC, the statute provided a sufficient definition in declaring 
spoofing an unlawful conduct.48 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See supra Section I.A. 
 47. In United States v. Coscia, the relevant jury instruction focused on the intent 
element without requiring the showing of other elements of prima facie price 
manipulation. United States v. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1094 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“The 
instruction the Court ultimately adopted reads, in relevant part: ‘Spoofing’ is defined as 
bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution. To find this 
element satisfied, you must find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that, at the time Mr. Coscia entered the bid or offer specified in the Count that you 
are considering, he intended to cancel the entire bid or offer before it was executed, and 
that he did not place the bid or offer as part of a legitimate, good-faith attempt to execute 
at least part of that bid or offer.”). 
 48. See United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656 (N.D. Ill. 2015); see also 
CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 4439945, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016) 
(“Defendants essentially assert three arguments: i) the Spoofing Statute is 
unconstitutionally vague, ii) CFTC Regulation 180.1 is unconstitutionally vague, and ii) 
the Spoofing Statute constitutes an unconstitutional delegation by Congress. The Court 
disagrees with all three.”); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (“[E]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness 
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A. CFTC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE 
The CFTC did not issue any final rules regarding spoofing.49 
However, the agency sought public comments on various questions 
regarding the new prohibition and issued a proposed interpretive order, 
interpretive guidance, and policy statement to guide the industry on its 
interpretation of Section 4c(a)(5)(C).50 Since the enactment of the 
prohibition, the CFTC has avoided narrowing the scope of spoofing into 
a pre-defined set of market behavior. Instead it has adopted a case-specific 
approach heavily reliant on particular facts and circumstances of the 
suspect market behavior.51  
1. Something More Than Recklessness 
According to CFTC interpretation, the statute requires a market 
participant “to act with some degree of intent, or scienter, beyond 
recklessness” for his conduct to constitute a breach of the CEA’s spoofing 
prohibition.52 Different than the strict liability standard accepted for 
“violat[ion of] bids and offers,” the statutory language of spoofing 
requires a showing of “intent to cancel a bid or offer before execution,” 
and the CFTC has stated that a showing of something greater than 
“reckless trading, practices, or conduct” is necessary to establish a 
                                                                                                                 
test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face 
economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant 
legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the ability to 
clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative 
process.”). 
 49. Regarding other CEA anti-manipulation provisions, the agency has adopted 
Prohibition on the Deployment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398 (July 14, 
2011). 
 50. See Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890 (May 28, 2013); 
Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,943 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011); 
Antidisruptive Practices Authority Contained in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,301, 67,302 (proposed Nov. 2, 2010) 
(requesting comments as part of advance notice of proposed). 
 51. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 184 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(“[L]arge positions can be indicative either of manipulation or of excessive 
speculation.”); Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,896. 
 52. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,896. 
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violation.53 Generally, a violation will not exist if the cancellation of the 
bid or offer was “part of a legitimate, good-faith attempt to consummate 
a trade.”54 In relation to “partial fills,” the agency abstained from 
declaring a bright line rule and generally stated that it shall conduct a 
facts-and-circumstances test based on an evaluation of the greater “market 
context,” “the person’s pattern of trading activity,” and other factors when 
distinguishing between legitimate trading and spoofing.55 
On July 14, 2011, the CFTC also adopted CFTC Regulation 
180.1(a)(1) pursuant to its authority under Section 753 of Dodd-Frank.56 
In relevant part, 180.1(a)(1) makes it  
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with any 
swap, or contract of sale of any commodity . . ., or contract for future 
delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to 
intentionally or recklessly . . . [u]se or employ, or attempt to use or 
employ, any manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.57  
In spoofing cases, CFTC generally relies on both Rule 180.1 and the 
statutory provision. 
Under commodities laws, scienter generally requires “the intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”58 Generally, a successful scienter 
pleading alleges facts showing that the defendants had motive and 
opportunity to commit the fraud, or alternatively, provides strong 
circumstantial evidence of “conscious misbehavior or recklessness.”59 To 
sufficiently plead illegitimate motives, a plaintiff should present concrete 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.; see also United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656 (rejecting the 
argument that the rule’s application is ambiguous in relation to partial fills). 
 56. Prohibition on the Deployment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,400. 
 57. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1) (2017); see also CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196, 
2016 WL 3693429, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2016). 
 58. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 376, 383 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 730 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013); see also id. at 383 n.20 (quoting 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007)) (“Although the 
Supreme Court was discussing securities fraud, its language is equally applicable to 
commodities fraud.”). 
 59. Id. (citation omitted). 
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benefits “that could be realized by one or more of the false statements and 
wrongful nondisclosures alleged.”60  
2. Relevant Markets and Transactions 
The spoofing prohibition covers all bids and offers on products 
traded on all registered entities, including bids and offers made in pre-
open periods or during other trading stoppages.61 Pursuant to Section 
2(a)(1)(C)(ii) of the CEA, futures contracts on broad-based security 
indexes also fall within provisions of CEA, together with futures on 
narrow-based security indexes, which are jointly regulated by the CFTC 
and the SEC. 
The agency further declared that a violation of the spoofing 
prohibition could occur in any trading platform, regardless of whether the 
platform operates on “order book functionality,” so long as the 
participants have the ability to send executable orders or transact against 
pending orders.62 According to the agency’s interpretation, examples of 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.; see also In re Bunge Global Markets, Inc., CFTC No. 11-10 (Mar. 22, 2011). 
 62. Amaranth, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 383. For a background on different market 
structures, see Charlie X. Cai et al., Trading Frictions and Market Structure: An 
Empirical Analysis, 35 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 563, 564-65 (2008) (“Consistent with earlier 
studies . . . our initial results suggest that the total cost of trading is lower on order driven 
systems. There is no doubt that for liquid securities the real cost of trading is lower 
because of increased order and competition from public investors (through limit order 
placement) for the provision of liquidity. However, our analysis also indicates that 
informational asymmetry is significantly higher on order driven systems, which could 
possibly be due to the anonymity of market participants (and counterparties to 
transactions) or stealth trading by informed investors. Significantly, order size has a 
major impact upon the level of informational and real frictions and medium trades have 
very high informational costs compared to small and large trades.”); see also James J. D. 
Wang & S. Viswanathan, Market Architecture: Limit Order Books Versus Dealership 
Markets 2 (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf 
m?abstract_id=135852 [https://perma.cc/676P-VJ7D ] (“(1) [A] risk neutral customer 
prefers to trade in a limit-order market instead of in any hybrid or dealership markets; (2) 
a risk averse customer prefers to trade in a dealership market over a limit-
order book market when the number of market makers is large and when the variation 
in order size is significant; and (3) for risk averse customers, the hybrid market structure, 
when properly structured, dominates the dealership market.”). See also generally 
Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker Pricing Model and Its Impact on the Securities 
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spoofing include (i) “submitting or cancelling bids or offers to overload 
the quotation system of a registered entity,” (ii) “submitting or cancelling 
bids or offers to delay another person’s execution of trades,” (iii) 
“submitting or cancelling multiple bids or offers to create an appearance 
of false market depth,” and (iv) “submitting or canceling bids or offers 
with intent to create artificial price movements upwards or downwards.”63 
Although spoofing has been previously prohibited by self-regulatory 
organizations, such prohibition was based on general conduct rules. 
Following the CFTC releases, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(“CME”) and Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) incorporated into their 
rules the above listed activities that the CFTC declared as examples of 
spoofing.64 The CME and ICE rules also expressly prohibit the entry of 
orders with the intent to modify them “to avoid execution.”65 
B. COSCIA CASE: INTENT TO SPOOF—CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
PROHIBITION 
The new prohibition was first tested following an enforcement action 
brought by the CFTC, in which the Commissioners ordered an energy 
trading company and its sole owner executing high frequency trading 
strategies to pay a monetary fine for breaching the prohibition.66 
                                                                                                                 
Market Structure: A Can of Worms for Securities Fraud?, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231 
(2014). 
 63. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,896, (May 28, 
2013). 
 64. CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH., MARKET REGULATION ADVISORY NOTICE: DISRUPTIVE 
PRACTICES PROHIBITED (2014); ICE FUTURES U.S., INC., TRADING RULES 4.02(l) (2012). 
The CME rule also identifies various conduct that would not be deemed spoofing such 
as an “order, entered with the intent to execute a bona fide transaction, that is 
subsequently modified or cancelled due to a perceived change in circumstances;” an 
“unintentional, accidental, or ‘fat-finger’ order;” and a bona fide stop-loss order. CHI. 
MERCANTILE EXCH., supra, at 4-5. 
 65. CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH., supra note 64, at 2; ICE FUTURES U.S., INC., supra 
note 64, at 4.02(l). 
 66. In re Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL 3817473, at *2 
(July 22, 2013) (“First, the algorithm placed a relatively small order on one side of the 
market at or near the best price being offered to buy or sell, in this instance a sell order 
for 17 contracts at a price of $85.29 per barrel, which was a lower price than the contracts 
then being offered by other market participants. Thus, the Respondents’ offer was at the 
lowest, i.e.[,] best, offered price. Second, within a fraction of a second, the Respondents 
entered orders to buy a relatively larger number of Light Sweet Crude Oil futures 
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Subsequently the sole owner of the company was found guilty by a jury 
for commodities fraud, as the Northern District of Illinois court rejected 
a motion for a new trial.67 In doing so, the court rejected arguments that a 
high number of order cancellations is an inherent and natural part of 
hyper-frequency trading and that the spoofing prohibition is 
unconstitutionally vague by failing to provide guidance regarding partial 
fills.68 The court also paid particular focus to evidence regarding the 
trading program and the programmer’s testimony regarding the program’s 
design, including its special features such as the placement of large quote 
orders to “stimulate the market,” the cancellation of large orders as soon 
as they started to fill, and a timer mechanism that was set on quote orders 
to avoid entering into any transactions.69 By holding that statutory 
authority regarding spoofing provides a proper definition for the unlawful 
conduct, the court also distinguished the case from prior case law where 
defendants prevailed in challenges brought against certain language in the 
                                                                                                                 
contracts at progressively higher prices: the first bid at $85.26, the second bid at $85.27, 
and the third bid at $85.28. The prices of Respondents’ bids were higher than the contracts 
then being bid by other market participants. Thus, Respondents’ placed their bids at the 
highest, i.e.[,] best[] prices. By placing the large buy orders, Respondents sought to give 
the market the impression that there was significant buying interest, which suggested that 
prices would soon rise, raising the likelihood that other market participants would buy 
the 17 lots the Respondents were then offering to sell. Although Respondents wanted to 
give the impression of buy-side interest, Respondents entered the large buy orders with 
the intent that these buy orders be canceled before the orders were actually executed.”). 
 67. United States v. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
 68. Id. at 1092-93. The court discussed the vagueness argument in depth in its prior 
opinion. See United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 657 (N.D. Ill. 2015) 
(“According to Coscia, the ongoing debate surrounding the meaning of spoofing 
‘illustrates the crucial point that the status of Mr. Coscia’s alleged conduct was an open 
question from the outset.’ (Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 28, at 24.) At the time of the alleged 
trades, September 2011, the only available interpretation of the statute was the CFTC’s 
proposed, nonbinding guidance. Even if this guidance had been binding, Coscia argues 
that his conduct was not encompassed by any of the three examples provided.”). 
 69. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 1087. (“[Government] introduced evidence, for 
example, suggesting that Coscia placed many more large quote orders than other traders, 
and then cancelled them at an unusually high rate (on one exchange at a rate of 99%). 
(Trial Tr. 299-300; Govt. Exs. ICE Summ. Charts 2-3.) The fact that some of his large 
orders were partially filled may have been a result of an imperfect program, as the 
Government points out—at least, the jury was entitled to believe so.”). 
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CEA.70 Under the CFTC guidance that was issued recently, the 
defendant’s arguments based upon general uncertainty in the public about 
the scope of the spoofing activity were unconvincing.71 The court 
emphasized the significance of the intent element in distinguishing 
between spoofing and bona fide Fill-Kill and partial-fill orders.72 
C. OYSTACHER CASE: THRESHOLD FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF—INTENT 
REVISITED 
In Oystacher, the alleged spoofing act did not involve automatized 
trading via algorithms, but rather involved manually conducted trading 
activity.73 Remarkably, the relevant enforcement action was based on 
complaints from various industry insiders, including well-known high-
frequency trading firm Citadel, whose traders detected the defendant’s 
suspicious activity in the E-Mini Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Price Index 
Futures Contracts market (“ES Market”) with their own resources.74 ES 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id.; see Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1987) (“wash sales”); United 
States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 632 F.3d 
177 (5th Cir. 2011) (“manipulate”); United States v. La Mantia, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 20,667 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1978) (“fictitious sales”). 
 71. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 659 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Congress had not defined the 
challenged term in the statute. In contrast, § 6(a)(C)(5) provides a definition of 
‘spoofing.’”). 
 72. Id. (“Coscia’s alleged ‘intent to cancel’ sets his conduct apart from the legitimate 
trading practices described in his memorandum. The conduct in the Indictment involves 
the entry of large-volume orders with the intent to ‘immediately cancel.’”). 
 73. CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 3693429, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 
12, 2016) (“Defendant Oystacher is a manual trader. (Tr. at 928.) As such, he manually 
executes trades based on his own observations. (Id. at 928-29.) To aid his manual trading, 
he uses a computer mouse that places pre-configured contract quantities depending on 
which buttons he clicks. (Id. at 966-67.) Specifically, the left button on Defendant 
Oystacher’s mouse submits larger orders, while the right button submits smaller orders. 
(Id.) These amounts vary depending on which markets Defendant Oystacher trades in. 
(Id. at 967.) In addition, Defendant Oystacher utilizes a ‘randomizer tool’ that randomizes 
the contract quantities he orders by either adding or subtracting a small amount each time 
he places an order.”). 
 74. Id. at *3 (“The defendant’s suspect activities spanned into the Commodity 
Exchange, Inc.’s High Grade Copper Futures Contracts market in December 2011, the 
New York Mercantile Exchange’s Light Sweet Crude Oil Futures Contracts market in 
May 2012, the NYMEX’s Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures Contracts market in 
November and December 2012, the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index 
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Market is “one of the most liquid equity index futures in the world,” and 
Citadel was “one of the largest traders in the world on the ES market.”75 
The company’s traders observed what they believed to be spoofing in 
May 2013 when Citadel’s profitability started to decline, and as a result, 
it was forced to unwind its participation in the ES market by over 50%.76 
Subsequently, the company started to investigate market data and develop 
a program to detect extreme order patterns, such as “instances of large 
order cancellations followed by quick trades on the opposite side at the 
same price.”77 There were also investigations filed against the defendant 
by NYMEX, COMEX, CME, ICE, and EUREX.78 
To decide whether to grant the CFTC’s requests for injunctive action 
to bar the defendant from trading, in a highly publicized eight-day 
hearing, the court heard testimonies from the representatives of domestic 
and international hyper-frequency trading firms, exchanges, regulatory 
authorities, and academic experts.79 The issue was whether the CFTC met 
its burden to show a statutory violation, and whether “there [was] a 
reasonable likelihood of future violations” that would justify the 
injunction.80 The court rejected the defendant’s argument for a heightened 
standard of proof in reaching its decision regarding the preliminary 
injunction. In doing so, the court categorized spoofing and price 
manipulation claims separately from other claims of fraud by refusing to 
adopt the Second Circuit’s heightened standard for similar claims in 
securities laws.81 
                                                                                                                 
Futures Contracts market in February and March 2013, the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange’s E-Mini Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Price Index Futures Contracts market 
in June and December 2013 and January 2014, and the CME’s Ten Year T-Note Treasury 
Futures market in February 2016.”). 
 75. Id. at *9. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at *10 (“Specifically, Citadel’s Pull-Swipe Detector flagged order entries 
where 1) over fifty percent of the total display size on one side of the market was 
cancelled just before 2) a trade of at least two hundred contracts was entered on the 
opposite side—a ‘fairly large trade’ relative to the ‘size showing at the top of the book,’ 
according to Mr. May. (Id. at 28-29.)”). 
 78. Id. at *19. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at *6. 
 81. Id. at *7 (“A number of other circuits have opted not to follow Unifund, instead 
applying the default standard the Seventh Circuit employs. See SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 
8 (1st Cir. 2002) (refusing to apply the Second Circuit’s statutory-injunction standard as 
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The court also addressed and rejected the argument that the 
prohibition lacked an “intelligible principle” and therefore was an 
unconstitutional delegation of power to the CFTC and federal courts.82 
The court summarized the relevant constitutional law principles that 
govern Congress’ authority to obtain assistance in the function of its 
legislative duties, the legislative history of Dodd-Frank, and the authority 
granted to the CFTC for interpreting and enforcing the CEA, as well as 
its various rulemaking powers.83 
The manual spoofing activity in Oystacher consisted of “large (at 
least doubling the number of contracts offered or bid at those price levels, 
or better) passive order(s) on one side of the market at or near the best bid 
or offer price, which were intended to be canceled before execution.”84 
To complete the scheme, the defendant would then 
cancel or attempt to cancel all of the spoof order(s) before they were 
executed and virtually simultaneously “flip” [its] position from buy to 
sell (or vice versa) by placing at least one aggressive order on the other 
side of the market at the same or better price to trade with market 
participants that had been induced to enter the market by the spoof 
orders they just canceled.85 
                                                                                                                 
defined in Unifund) (citing Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1036-37); see also CFTC v. Hunter Wise 
Commodities, LLC, 749 F.3d 967, 974 (11th Cir. 2014) (‘Binding precedent in this circuit 
suggests, and other circuits have held, that where the [CFTC] seeks to enjoin future 
violations, it must also show a reasonable likelihood of future violations in addition to a 
prima facie case of illegality.’)”); CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Grp., 680 F.2d 573, 582 n.16 
(9th Cir. 1982). It should be also noted that the S.D.N.Y. refused to apply the heightened 
pleading standard to the spoofing claims both in Wilson and Tower Research, since a 
price manipulation claim does not necessarily entail a claim of fraud in the strict sense 
regardless of the plaintiff’s formulation of its arguments. See Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower 
Research Capital LLC, 165 F. Supp. 3d 42, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The Wilson court 
decided that, because the attempted manipulation was effectuated through ‘a particular 
trading strategy’ and did not involve ‘misleading statements or omissions,’ the complaint 
did not sound in fraud and therefore should be evaluated under the ‘flexible pleading 
standard[ ] of Rule 8(a)’ rather than the more stringent standard of Rule 9(b). Id. at 532. 
The Court finds Wilson’s reasoning persuasive.”). 
 82. CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 4439945, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 
23, 2016). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Oystacher, 2016 WL 3693429, at *1. 
 85. Id. at *4 (“The CFTC’s Complaint . . . charges Defendants with (1) spoofing the 
futures market in violation of Section 4c(a)(5)(C) of the CEA and (2) employing a 
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During the hearings, the court heard expert testimony from Professor 
Bessembinder who was hired by the CFTC in 2014 to study market data 
(limited order book data that is visible to market participants) and the 
order data (the more comprehensive and less accessible log of entire 
market activity) in relation to potential spoofing. One of the study 
methods used by Professor Bessembinder was primarily concentrated on 
“flip” patterns in the defendant’s trading.86 A flip is “a cancellation of an 
order [that was] followed by an opposite side order entry within 0.005 
seconds and at the same or better price.”87 According to Professor 
Bessembinder, a flip is usually a very rare phenomenon that is never 
observed in almost 99% of the accounts trading in the relevant markets.88 
The defendant ultimately had more than 28,000 orders that fitted the 
“flipping pattern” definition.89 The court also accounted for the 
defendant’s cancellations in terms of quantity90 and their percentage of 
the total order number. However, despite this evidence, the court 
ultimately rejected the CFTC’s request to bar the defendant from trading 
due to the CFTC’s failure to provide sufficient evidence that the 
defendant’s unlawful conduct would continue.91 Although the court 
voiced concerns regarding the defendant’s suspect activities that 
continued despite several investigations by various market operators, the 
court refused to issue an injunction, since the efforts of the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                 
manipulative device, scheme, or artifice in violation of Section 6(c)(1) of the CEA and 
CFTC Regulation 180.1.”). 
 86. Id. at *23. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at *25 (“In other words, Defendant Oystacher’s cancellations at the flip were 
larger than other participants’ in both absolute size and relative share of total entered 
orders. Defendant Oystacher cancelled 36.9 percent of his Natural Gas contracts, for 
example, while all other participants combined cancelled only 0.3 percent. (R. 134, CFTC 
Exh. 95, at 12.) He cancelled 35.2, 33.4, and 25.7 percent of his VIX, Crude Oil, and 
Copper contracts, respectively, while the rest of participants in those markets cancelled 
0.1 percent in all three. (Id.) Finally, during December 2013 and January 2014, Defendant 
Oystacher cancelled 29.5 percent of his ES contracts, and all other market participants 
cancelled only 0.6 percent.”). 
 91. Id. at *39 (“Importantly, ‘past misconduct does not lead necessarily to the 
conclusion that there is a likelihood of future misconduct[.]’ While past misconduct can 
be ‘highly suggestive of the likelihood of future violations, ... the court should look to the 
“totality of the circumstances”’ before drawing any inferences.” (citations omitted)). 
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compliance officer in implementing and enforcing restrictions on trading 
size and speed were sufficient to render the trading ban unnecessary.92 It 
was reported in October 2016 that the CFTC had agreed, in principle, to 
a settlement with the defendant.93 
D. SARAO AND OTHERS: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, COLLECTIVE 
SPOOFING 
The CFTC has reached successful settlements in several spoofing-
related enforcement actions against traders located overseas.94 The 
enforcement case against Sarao was brought under the pre-Dodd-Frank 
authority. The U.K.-resident defendant was found to have conducted 
spoofing over a long span in the E-mini S&P futures market—including 
during the day of the infamous flash crash.95 The defendant operated a 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at *42 (“Defendants have implemented, among others, the ‘Dynamic Max 
Quantity at Price Tool’ and the ‘Delayed Replace for Cancel/Replace Tool’—compliance 
tools to self-monitor and regulate Defendant Oystacher’s trading size and speed, 
respectively. Importantly, these two trading characteristics are fundamental to 
Defendants’ ability to violate the relevant statutes and regulations, enhancing the 
effectiveness of Defendants’ discontinuance. All of the compliance tools Defendants 
have self-implemented are adverse to their interests. These tools aim to prevent 
Defendant Oystacher from successfully engaging in a ‘bait and switch flipping 
scheme.’”). 
 93. Janan Hanna, CFTC Settling Suit Against 3Red’s Accused Spoofer Oystacher, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-19/cft 
c-reaches-settlement-with-3red-s-accused-spoofer-oystacher [https://perma.cc/BR68-W 
5GB]. 
 94. Consent Order, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-3398 (E.D. Ill. 
Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documen 
ts/legalpleading/enfsaraoorder111416.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8EB-TZJH]; Consent 
Order, CFTC v. Khara, No. 15 CV 03497 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) http://www.cft 
c.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfheetsalimo
rder033116.pdf [https://perma.cc/R75A-ZPMD]. 
 95. Consent Order, Nav Sarao, supra note 94, at 11-12 (“During the Relevant Period, 
on average: it took only 500 milliseconds for the Dynamic Layering Program’s layered 
sell orders to move in unison and in symmetry with the market price after a change (either 
up or down) in market price. Defendants’ layered sell orders contained approximately 
2,000 sell orders (at multiple price levels), with a combined average face value of 
approximately $128,615,160. The Dynamic Layering Program was active approximately 
7 minutes at a time, and, when active, the E-mini S&P prices dropped, on average, more 
than 1 tick. Defendants’ Genuine Executed Orders were at least 1. 7 times more profitable 
per contract traded when the Dynamic Layering Program was active than when no Spoof 
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“dynamic layering algorithm” using his own personal computer, which 
enabled him to deceive the market participants about the real market 
price. The evidence in the case demonstrates how an individual trader 
with modest technical resources can hold significant disruptive power in 
one of the most liquid markets when he consciously and consistently 
employs disruptive order strategies. The case also reflects the growing 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. commodities regulation.96 
Similarly, in Khara, an enforcement action was brought against an 
individual trader and his introducing broker, both residents of the United 
Arab Emirates, for concerted spoofing activity (both as a principal and as 
an accomplice) regarding trade orders in the CME Globex Gold futures 
market.97 The case demonstrates how spoofing can be executed by the 
concerted actions of more than a single trader.98 The enforcement action 
                                                                                                                 
Orders were active. During the Relevant Period, only 90 of the Defendants’ 19,888 
layered sell orders were even partially executed. During the Relevant Period, Defendants 
profited at least $9,667,258.22 as a result of the Dynamic Layering Program.”). 
 96. However, in Tower Research, a class action claim brought by Korean individuals 
against a U.S. resident for spoofing in a Korean stock index futures traded on CME 
Globex located in Illinois, the S.D.N.Y. granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for 
failure to state sufficient contacts with the U.S. See Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower Research 
Capital LLC, 165 F. Supp. 3d 42, 49-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). In its Morrison analysis, due 
to the organizational separation between the CME (a domestic exchange) and the CME 
Globex, the court treated CME Globex “not as a domestic exchange but rather . . . simply 
a technological platform utilized by other exchanges to effectuate trading.” Id. at 50. 
 97. Consent Order, Khara, supra note 94. 
 98. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 6-7, Khara, No. 15 CV 03497 (JPO) 
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2015) (“For example, on April 28, 2015, Defendant Salim had an order 
for Gold futures on one side of the book. Defendant Khara entered layered orders on the 
opposite side of the book as Defendant Salim’s orders, which caused COMEX market 
participants to fill Defendant Salim’s orders. After Defendant Salim’s orders were filled, 
Defendant Khara cancelled his layered orders. An example of the coordinated effort to 
engage in spoofing is as follows: On April 27, 2015, at 05:49:37.957 a.m. Central 
Standard Time, Salim placed one 3-lot bid in the June 2015 Gold futures contract at the 
second book level (price of 11817). Approximately three seconds later, at 05:49:40.725 
a.m., Khara began to enter 5-lot offers. Between 05:49:40.725 and 05:49:43.725 a.m., 
Khara entered 17 5-lot offers for a total sell side exposure of 85 contracts. The offers 
were entered in descending price starting at 11820 through 11818. One millisecond after 
entering the fourteenth 5-lot offer (05:49:43.420 a.m.) all contracts of Salim’s bid traded 
(05:49:43:421). After this sequence, Khara cancelled all of his offers. Based on this 
conduct, Market Regulation conducted a review of Defendants’ accounts, for the period 
of March 1, 2015 to April 29, 2015, in the April 2015 Gold, June 2015 Gold and May 
2015 Silver contracts. During the Relevant Period, Defendants Khara and Salim appeared 
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was predicated by the CME Group’s identification and reporting of the 
misconduct, including suspending the defendants’ accounts and notifying 
the regulators. It also shows how, regardless of order sizes, spoofing 
activity can be detected if properly monitored by market operators.99 
E. SELF-REGULATORY ACTIONS; PRIVATE ACTIONS AND ANONYMOUS 
DEFENDANTS; WHISTLEBLOWER REPORTS 
In the enforcement of the law and regulatory rules relating to 
technically sophisticated hyper-frequency trading activities, the practical 
constraints necessitate greater involvement of exchanges in the policing 
of suspicious trading activities.100 Proponents of structural reform argue 
that instead of emphasizing ex post enforcement of abstract and 
complicated laws and regulations, the reform efforts must focus on 
revising and developing market structures, which will restrain or 
eliminate manipulative activity by their own design.101 Therefore, 
policies, procedures, and technological tools developed by the exchanges 
hold great importance in reaching an efficient equilibrium between public 
and private regulation due to the exchanges’ primary positions as the day-
to-day enablers and managers of the trading infrastructure.102 
In recognition of its greater role in this regard, the CME Group 
brought sixteen cases related to spoofing before the CME Business 
Conduct Committee in 2015—a substantial increase from the number of 
such cases in 2014.103 These cases were generally brought under Rules 
                                                                                                                 
to routinely place large aggregate quantities opposite smaller orders that would then 
trade, and then the large orders would be cancelled. On information and belief, Khara 
traded more than 300 futures contracts as a result of Salim’s large opposite-side exposure, 
and Salim traded more than 150 futures contracts as a result of Khara’ s large opposite 
side exposure.”). 
 99. See id. 
 100. Yesha Yedav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA L. REV. 1032, 
1090 (2016). 
 101. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 656–75 (2006). 
 102. Yedav, supra note 100, at 1090. 
 103. Matthew Leising, Spoofing Went Mainstream in 2015, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/nabbing-the-rogue-algo-in 
side-the-year-spoofing-went-mainstream [https://perma.cc/SM3A-V8KY]. 
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432 and 575104 and ended in six-figure settlements.105 This development 
can be attributed to various factors. First, to avoid liability risk, exchanges 
may be taking the initiative by acting timely to nullify potential future 
claims that they may face as alleged enablers of illegal conduct. Secondly, 
such rapid advancement of spoofing enforcement on the exchange level 
can also be explained by a greater consensus among market participants 
against spoofing, and a demand by the market to improve fairness and 
integrity in the markets in this regard. In this respect, greater enforcement 
of the spoofing prohibition by exchanges can also act as a safeguard for 
the industry to avoid negative reputational costs, which may result from 
CFTC enforcement actions. 
On the other hand, another important feature of the spoofing 
prohibition is that the statute explicitly makes it available to private 
market participants as a private cause of action.106 From a regulatory 
efficiency perspective, this development is likely to have both positive 
and negative effects.107 From an enforcement resources perspective, an 
increase in the number of private lawsuits brought against conduct that 
allegedly constitutes spoofing will lighten the CFTC’s burden in 
enforcing the prohibition and encourage the agency to focus its 
enforcement on the most important cases. This will also improve the 
actual deterrent effect of the prohibition. On the other hand, private 
                                                                                                                 
 104. E.g., HTG Capital Partners, LLC v. Doe(s), No. 15 C 02129, 2015 WL 5611333, 
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2015) (“CME Group’s Market Regulation Advisory Notice also 
clarifies that ‘Rule 575 prohibits the type of activity identified by the Commission as 
“spoofing,” including submitting or canceling multiple bids or offers to create a 
misleading appearance of market depth and submitting or cancelling bids or offers with 
intent to create artificial price movements upwards or downwards.’”). 
 105. For a comprehensive list of the CME spoofing actions, see James A. Overdahl & 
Kwon Y. Park, The Exercise of Anti-Spoofing Authority in U.S. Futures Markets: Policy 
and Compliance Consequences, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., May 2016, at 1. 
 106. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012). 
 107. For a critique of judicially created private rights of action in areas entrusted to 
agency enforcement, see Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and 
Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1206-07 (1982) (“Judicial creation of private 
rights of action raises greater difficulties when the legislature has entrusted enforcement 
of a statutory scheme to a specialized administrative agency that is empowered to issue 
rules or to adjudicate controversies under the statute. In this context, private rights of 
action may usurp the agency’s responsibility for regulatory implementation, decrease 
legislative control over the nature and amount of enforcement activity, and force courts 
to determine in the first instance the meaning of a regulatory statute.”). 
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litigation will impede the cohesive development of law in this area by 
excluding the agency and its expertise, and potentially cause 
interpretative differences between different circuits and the agency in 
relation to the particulars of the spoofing prohibition.108 Furthermore, 
because the private claimants will often be members of the particular 
exchange in which the alleged spoofing activity took place, certain 
restrictions that are frequently found in the exchange rules—such as 
compulsory arbitration and data confidentiality—will likely undermine 
the efficient enforcement of the spoofing prohibition through private 
litigation. 
As a relevant example, in 2015 a trader in the Chicago Board of 
Trade filed a claim against anonymous defendants for conducting 
spoofing.109 The plaintiff also issued a non-party subpoena to the CME 
Group—which operates CBOT and CMEX exchanges—to identify the 
anonymous counterparties and provide the relevant market data 
pertaining to the suspicious activity.110 The defendants challenged this 
subpoena on privacy grounds, and CME joined the motion.111 
Subsequently, the anonymous defendants moved to compel arbitration 
under CBOT rules, as required for the resolution of disputes arising 
between CBOT members. The court ultimately granted the defendants’ 
motion to proceed anonymously and their motion to compel arbitration 
after in-camera review of the relevant evidence documenting the 
defendants’ membership in CBOT.112 The case demonstrates the 
difficulties of bringing private actions for spoofing due to the 
informational asymmetries in the market structure, as well as due to 
potential forum shopping problems and other market asymmetries that 
may result from the conflict among different enforcement rights of market 
participants based on the particular market(s) of which they are members. 
However, as demonstrated in cases like Oystacher where the agency 
action substantially relied on data provided by other trading firms, the 
jurisdictional and other problems the market participants may have in 
bringing private actions are likely compensated by the CFTC’s newly 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See generally Cass R. Sunstein et. al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1186 (2002). 
 109. HTG Capital Partners, 2015 WL 5611333, at *1. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. HTG Capital Partners, LLC v. Doe 1, No. 15 C 02129, 2016 WL 612861, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2016). 
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established whistleblower program. The program provides monetary 
incentives to industry insiders and other individuals in possession of 
material information regarding potential spoofing activity who report 
such information to the CFTC.113 In fact, market participants often 
conduct in-depth studies regarding the markets—order books in 
particular—as part of their day-to-day trading business with significant 
analytical tools and analysts at their disposal. Under the CFTC’s 
whistleblower program, such firms and individuals can be granted 
significant monetary awards once the agency finds that they have reported 
substantive and original information about the deployment of disruptive 
trading strategies such as spoofing and thus have significantly assisted the 
CFTC’s enforcement activities.114 As a result of the aforementioned limits 
that market participants will have in pursuing private rights of action, 
there is potential for an increase in the number of trading firms and 
independent observers who will seek to monetize such material 
information they may have generated in their internal market studies. In 
this sense, the whistleblower program may reduce informational 
asymmetries and improve enforcement efficiencies by placing the CFTC 
in a more central position in monitoring wrongful conduct and evaluating 
potential incidents of illegality based on the agency’s greater statutory 
purpose and institutional power. On the other hand, the monopolization 
of enforcement power at the hands of the regulators may predicate a 
selective enforcement agenda, which may cause a sentiment of 
indiscriminate and inconsistent enforcement of the rules within the 
expanding jurisdiction of the agency. 
                                                                                                                 
 113. 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 165 (2017) (providing the rules and 
requirements of the whistleblower program). 
 114. 17 C.F.R. § 165.2 (2017). Subject to a decision by the agency’s staff and based 
on the applicable rules, Dodd-Frank authorizes the agency to grant awards that are 
between 10 and 30 percent of the monetary sanctions successfully imposed in the judicial 
or administrative action resulting from the original information. Id. § 165.8. 
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III. COMPARING CEA SPOOFING PROHIBITION WITH SECURITIES 
LAWS 
Generally, SEC actions for spoofing in trading have been primarily 
brought under Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange 
Act”).115 Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to: 
effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of transactions 
in any security . . . creating actual or apparent active trading in such 
security, or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the 
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.116 
Although the language of the provision effectively brings spoofing under 
its coverage, it more closely resembles the pre-Dodd-Frank commodities 
price manipulation standard, and significantly differs from the simplistic 
formulation adopted in the CEA (as amended by Dodd-Frank).117 Thus, 
with the enactment of the standalone commodities spoofing cause of 
action, a divergence seems to have formed between the price 
manipulation prohibitions of the commodities and securities laws with 
respect to the activities that fall under the definition of spoofing.118 More 
specifically, the CEA’s spoofing prohibition requires a simple showing 
that the defendant did not have a bona fide intent to enter into a transaction 
when submitting an offer or a bid to the relevant market. On the other 
hand, Section 9(a)(2) requires the showing of specific intent to manipulate 
market prices,119 and a simple showing of spoofing activity may not be 
sufficient in some cases to meet the more onerous pleading standard. 
                                                                                                                 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2012); see Afshar, Securities Act Release No. 9983, 
Exchange Act Release No. 76,546, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,926, 2015 
WL 7770262 (Dec. 3, 2015); Briargate Trading, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9959, 
Exchange Act Release No. 76,104, 2015 WL 5868196 (Oct. 8, 2015); Visionary Trading 
LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71,871, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,007, 
108 SEC Docket 2594 (Apr. 4, 2014); Hold Bros. On-Line Inv. Servs., LLC, Exchange 
Act Release No. 67,924, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,213, 104 SEC Docket 
2686 (Sept. 25, 2012). 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2012). 
 117. John I. Sanders, Spoofing: A Proposal for Normalizing Divergent Securities and 
Commodities Futures Regimes, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 517 (2016). 
 118. Id. 
 119. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2012). 
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Generally, markets for individual stocks, narrow-based index 
contracts, and corresponding futures and option markets are regulated by 
the SEC. However, the SEC shares regulatory authority with the CFTC in 
relation to securities-based swaps, and the CFTC has greater regulatory 
authority over broad-based index funds—such as S&P 500 index funds 
and other equity-based passive index ETFs—that have recently seen 
tremendous growth as convenient and diversified vehicles for investors to 
channel their capital into equity markets. This interconnectivity between 
commodities and securities markets was clearest during the flash crash, 
in which spoofing-like activity in index markets was a likely factor in 
causing massive market volatility. Thus, a concerted harmonization effort 
by the SEC and the CFTC, as well as the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority and the National Futures Association is necessary to streamline 
market monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and to remediate the 
potential conflicts between the two legal domains.120 If left unaddressed, 
the current situation may encourage regulatory forum shopping among 
traders, who may channel their activities to less-regulated trading 
regimes.121    
CONCLUSION  
The statutory enactment provides clarity to at least the fundamental 
questions of whether spoofing is a disruptive practice, and whether it 
negatively affects market integrity and markets’ pricing functions by 
creating a statutory assumption in the positive.122 Although the spoofing 
prohibition could previously be enforced under the general commodities 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See Eric Hess, Spoofing Surveillance and Enforcement a Major Challenge for 
Regulators, TABB F. (May 18, 2015), http://www.tabbforum.com/opinions/spoofing-sur 
veillance-and-enforcement-a-major-challenge-for-regulators [https://perma.cc/B2P8-TH 
5N]. 
 121. Sanders, supra note 117, at 536. 
 122. See Craig Pirrong, I’m Not Spoofing You About Judicial Overkill, STREETWISE 
PROFESSOR, (Nov. 4, 2015), http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=9678 [https://perma.cc/V 
JF6-8HLH]. Professor Pirrong also argues that the impact of spoofing conduct will be 
limited because the victims of spoofing are generally sophisticated traders who can 
respond quickly to market conditions and take prompt action to protect themselves from 
further damage. See id.; see also Jane Croft, Ex-SEC Economist to Testify on Flash Crash, 
FIN. TIMES, (Oct. 22, 2015) https://www.ft.com/content/c6d56100-78c5-11e5-a95a-27d3 
68e1ddf7 [https://perma.cc/4863-P6XJ] (“A former chief economist of the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission is set to testify on behalf of a UK trader accused of playing a 
role in the flash crash of 2010 while trading from his bedroom.”). 
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anti-manipulation laws, defendants in these cases could assert a wide 
range of defenses and even raise the issue of whether spoofing, from a 
market theory perspective, can be a form of price manipulation. By 
creating a stand-alone cause of action for spoofing, the prohibition can be 
seen as an attempt to simplify the already complex inquiries that usually 
arise in price manipulation claims (though it does not make them any 
easier). These issues are often difficult for lay juries to properly digest, 
since the defendants often rely on expert opinions who use advanced 
market theory. Although the adoption of the stand-alone prohibition does 
not solve the evidentiary difficulties in establishing the required mental 
state (i.e., not having the intent to enter into transactions), it provides a 
much-needed explicit normative basis on which regulators and market 
operators can rely. 
The enactment of the independent cause of action is also likely to lift 
compliance standards. It will reduce the threshold for potential secondary 
liability of market-makers, clearing brokers, and other intermediaries who 
knowingly turn a blind eye to spoofing by their clients and customers—in 
effect aiding and abetting conduct that is unlawful under the CEA. At least 
in the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence, a strong showing of affirmative 
assistance may not be necessary to meet 12(b)(6) pleading standards to 
create secondary liability in similar cases.123 The risk for secondary 
liability is particularly high for futures commission merchants124 who 
transmit orders on behalf of their clients.125 In the context of wash sales, 
the courts have considered the fact that wash sales were specifically 
prohibited by the CEA and the relatively easier identification of wash sale 
activity as factors that may potentially increase the liability risk of 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 183 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“[A] complaint with weak allegations about a defendant’s affirmative assistance 
may still state a claim for aiding and abetting if its allegations about the defendant’s 
knowledge and intent are particularly strong, and vice versa.”). 
 124. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28) (defining futures commission merchant); see also First Am. 
Discount Corp. v. CFTC, 222 F.3d 1008, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“An FCM is the 
commodity market’s equivalent of a securities brokerage house, soliciting and accepting 
orders for futures contracts and accepting funds or extending credit in connection 
therewith.”). 
 125. See In re LFG, L.L.C., CFTC No. 01–19, 2001 WL 940235, at *1 (Aug. 20, 
2001); In re Piasio, CFTC No. 97–9, 2000 WL 1466069, at *3 (Sept. 29, 2000), aff’d sub 
nom. Piasio v. CFTC, 54 Fed.Appx. 702 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Mitsubishi Corp., CFTC 
No. 97–10, 1997 WL 345634, at *2–3 (June 24, 1997); In re Three Eight Corp., CFTC 
No. 88–33, 1993 WL 212489, at *1 (June 16, 1993). 
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derivatives brokers.126 For self-regulating entities and trading 
infrastructure providers, the adoption of a prudent compliance strategy 
can minimize future regulatory risks. 
The spoofing prohibition may affect algorithmic traders significantly 
by forcing traders to modify their existing trading algorithms. Different 
from manual spoofing, when a trader employs algorithmic trading to 
conduct spoofing, the algorithm’s code often provides direct evidence to 
establish the necessary element of intent. It may, at first sight, seem 
difficult to draw a bright line between lawful trading and spoofing activity 
in the world of high frequency trading, as order cancellation is a natural 
part of most legitimate trading strategies. However, spoofing can be 
distinguished from other hyper-frequency strategies such as pinging and 
front-running, as when properly deployed, the latter strategies involve 
bona fide transactions entered into with an intent to detect market 
appetite.127 Regardless of order size, market participants are advised to 
review their algorithmic trading strategies, insofar as they involve 
frequent and volatile position changes (flips) and high cancellation ratios 
if they can be interpreted to demonstrate that the relevant order 
cancellations have no legitimate purpose other than causing artificial 
price movements. Under the statutory definition, a single event of order 
cancellation is sufficient to establish the offense if the co-existing factors 
provide sufficient circumstantial evidence that the trader, more likely than 
not, never intended to enter into any transaction when submitting the bid 
or the offer. 
On the other hand, the rule’s effectiveness in providing fair and 
meaningful deterrence from suspicious conduct will largely depend on the 
developing case law, and clarity in the CFTC’s future regulatory guidance 
and enforcement actions.128 Indeed, due to the prominence of hyper-
frequency trading strategies in today’s markets, the CFTC is faced with a 
difficult task in monitoring numerous markets within its jurisdiction and 
identifying the instances of spoofing among millions of order 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Amaranth, 730 F.3d at 187 (“Wash orders are explicitly banned by the CEA and, 
because they involve simultaneous or shortly spaced transactions to buy and sell the same 
quantity of a commodity or stock, they are much more recognizable to the broker 
transmitting them.”). 
 127. See Gregory Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed ‘Pinging’ and 
‘Front Running’ in the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607 (2015). 
 128. However, the difficulties of factual determinations by juries in price 
manipulation cases and the exchange’s reliance on mandatory arbitration will likely 
inhibit the development of judicially created rules. 
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cancellations. This practical difficulty may inevitably cause the agency to 
pursue actions against the most visible high-volume traders in a 
disproportionate manner, which may in turn undermine the promise of the 
spoofing prohibition as a market rule that is enforced in a fair and equal 
manner for all market participants. The potential risks posed by the 
prospect of selective enforcement can be mitigated by greater cooperation 
with market operators by prioritizing self-regulatory measures and other 
structural safeguards that may be implemented within the daily trading 
infrastructures. 
From a compliance perspective, the rule poses a particular challenge 
for market actors, as the scope of the prohibition and the evidentiary 
difficulties that often arise in showing the necessary intent to commit 
spoofing may undermine the market actors’ efforts to properly assess the 
relevant regulatory risks and to devise proper implementation policies.129 
The current state of the law, where a stand-alone spoofing prohibition 
exists only as applicable to commodities markets, can also create 
asymmetrical regulatory standards between commodities and securities 
markets. This problem might be particularly acute and may cause legal 
discrepancies in relation to financial assets that have the characteristics of 
both a commodity and a securities instrument and that are subject to 
regulation by both the SEC and CFTC. 
As the relevant case law further develops and the CFTC fine-tunes 
its interpretation of what can potentially constitute spoofing, participants 
of the commodities markets are advised to pay close attention to these 
developments and to revise their trading strategies, relevant policies and 
procedures, and technical infrastructure to ensure compliance with the 
new standards emerging in this field. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Letter from R.T. Leuchtkafer to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 4, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-bats-2015-57/bats201557-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3 
8R-N5UE] (“It’s also a mystery how a firm can post bona fide orders on eight exchanges 
if it fully intends to cancel on seven of them when any one trades. That behavior sounds 
as if it easily falls within the spoofing definitions quoted earlier . . . . At minimum, in this 
example the business model seems to bake in an 87.5% intention of cancelling any given 
order before it’s executed. At what point does ‘market making’ become spoofing in this 
model? We can likely agree any firm posting an order it is 100% certain to cancel is over 
the line. Now move that line to 99%. If I intend to cancel 99 times out of 100, is that a 
bona fide order? How about a 9-in-10 intent to cancel? How about 7-in-8? And how does 
anyone looking at an exchange’s quote tell the difference?”). 
